Friday, July 17, 2009

Turbo Yo Yo



Dave Schulte tells his yo yo students that if they aren't getting head injuries, they're not trying hard enough.

The 39-year-old Mr. Schulte is a professional yo-yoist who makes $50,000 a year giving lessons and performing. He's got the world on a string -- and a right index finger that's numb from years of yo-yoing.

The sport has been transformed by metal and industrial-plastic yo-yos with ball bearings that spin so fast the tricks possible today would have been unthinkable a few years back. The string spider webs of the "Corn Pops Explosion," the freehand whirls of the "Yosemite Escape" or the tightly wound spins of the "Cold Metal" are all made possible because of advances in yo-yo technology.

The world record for "sleeping," when the yo-yo is at the bottom of the string but spinning rapidly, has gone from just over seven minutes in 1998 to 16 minutes and 17 seconds.

Trouble is, a fast yo-yo can be a dangerous yo-yo. Hardcore yo-yoists now upload images of their battle wounds online: chipped teeth, calloused hands, bandaged brows. Mr. Schulte's angiogram of his right hand showing the ruined veins in his index finger is circulated widely via email among yo-yoists.

At last year's World Yo-Yo Competition, one competitor was carted off on a stretcher. The injured yo-yoist, from Singapore, dislocated his knee during a freestyle competition, which often involves intense full-body choreography.

Simple yo-yos have been around for centuries, but the modern ones have their roots in the 1920s, when Filipino-American Pedro Flores opened a yo-yo shop in Santa Barbara, Calif. American marketer Donald Duncan then bought the company and began pushing manufactured versions nationwide. Most were made of wood or plastic. The inexpensive toys were a hit during the Great Depression.

Throughout the 1950s, Duncan sent traveling yo-yoists across the country to peddle their wares and demonstrate tricks at shopping centers and schoolyards. But sales slipped, and the company filed for bankruptcy-court protection in 1965. Three years later, Flambeau Inc. in Baraboo, Wis., bought Duncan and now runs the company. To celebrate Duncan's 80th anniversary, the company is resurrecting the yo-yo demonstrations of yore, enlisting 66 yo-yo professionals to conduct more than 130 demonstrations this summer. The yo-yoists are also featured on newly released trading cards.

The current economic downturn has been good for Duncan. The company, which sells more than two-thirds of the yo-yos in the U.S., says sales are up 23% from a year ago. Most of their "bread and butter" yo-yos retail for less than $20, says Mike Burke, spokesman for Duncan.

New Duncan yo-yo models, such as the free-hand Hayabusa or the $499 Freehand Mg made of 99% magnesium, are created by Duncan's yo-yoists. The stringers regularly submit drawings and prototypes of their models.

The company will unroll a new line of high-end yo-yos this summer. They feature wider axles to allow for wiggle room for complex tricks, precision ball-bearings for smooth glides and perfectly weighted casings for an even touch.

Still, Duncan doesn't cut it for some extreme yo-yo practitioners. They build their own.

Brian Roberts, better known in the yo-yo world as "Doctor Popular," is holding on to 100 Bolt yo-yos that he custom designed out of a high-grade plastic called Celcon that's impossible to shatter. Mr. Roberts, of San Francisco, also sports a flaming yo-yo tattoo on his left arm. His right arm is so much larger than his left, because of yo-yoing he says, that the sleeves of some of his T-shirts are too tight.

Mr. Roberts once sold a "Silver Bullet 2" yo-yo to a man who had recently been robbed at gunpoint while working at a gas station in Minnesota. The Bullet is known for its sharp edges, high-end metal body and fast spin. "His boss wouldn't let him get a gun," he says. "I think he thought he was a ninja."

Pat Cuartero, 28, of New York, left a six-figure gig as a technology programmer at Merrill Lynch in 2006 to pursue yo-yoing full time. Before he got out of Wall Street, Mr. Cuartero regularly toted his favorite yo-yos in his suit pockets and in briefcases. He regularly spun two-handed while on conference calls.

Now, he runs a company called YoYoNation that sells yo-yos, organizes competitions and plays host to online discussion forums. Mr. Cuartero, who specializes in two-handed play, boasts palms white with calluses and middle fingers with permanent string indentations. He says that though his wrists ache sometimes, "I've never been happier."

Some yo-yoists still cling to the slower and safer models. Valerie Oliver of Fort Worth, Texas, uses a classic fixed-axle Technic yo-yo when she performs at schools. She started with a Duncan Imperial made of plastic in 1962 when she was 6 years old. Her yo-yo group, the Lone Star Spinners, has met once a month for more than a decade.

Newer models used by the pros don't actually return to the hand when thrown down. That allows for longer string play. "I want my yo-yo to come back when I jerk it," Ms. Oliver says.

An out-of-control yo-yo can cause big trouble. Paul Yath of Lakewood, Calif., shattered his apartment window a couple of winters ago. The cotton string "just snapped" while he was performing a difficult maneuver and shot the metal yo-yo like a bullet across the room. Another time, the four-time national champion took a bloody cut above his brow to the emergency room. He didn't need stitches.

These days, Mr. Yath carries two sets of backup yo-yos when he goes onstage, he says. "You never know when you might hit an unexpected snag," he says.

Although Mr. Schulte, of Brooklyn Park, Minn., says he's accustomed to the numbness in his index finger, he was recently rudely reminded that his face is far from numb. While he was performing a stunt called "the trapeze" before a group of seniors at a nursing home, a snagged string backfired. The metal, sharp-edged yo-yo cut his right cheek. That drew some blood, but in this business, too, the show must go on. "You just keep going," he says.

from WSJ, 7-17-09

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

In Development: Google Web Browser to Replace Retail Software



Google Inc.'s plans for a new operating system based on its Chrome Web browser is a big bet that online programs can eventually surpass desktop software.

Now the Internet giant is pushing hard to make that happen, enticing developers to take advantage of several technologies to improve the speed, aesthetics and reliability of software running in a Web browser.

Google is trying to spur a new market for software that can run entirely in a Web browser, such as Google Docs. The search giant believes that online applications will be one of its next big businesses, as its core search and search-advertising businesses mature.

But it faces heavy competition, including from rival Microsoft Corp., which Monday announced it will offer online versions of its popular Office software to consumers free.

Web browsers originally were used mainly to view static pages of text and images. Their capabilities for playing video and animation have improved using technologies such as Adobe Systems Inc.'s Flash -- software that is used by Google's YouTube service -- and others that require users to download a program called a plug-in.

But browsers still can't typically handle many chores conventional PC software users take for granted, like some mechanisms for copying and pasting text and playing games that use three-dimensional graphics.

Google hopes to change that by accelerating the adoption of HTML 5, the acronym for an extension of the hypertext markup language that is a foundation of the Web. The proposed programming standards -- which are likely years from being finalized, and include technology from Google and others -- are designed to let developers build more advanced applications that can run within a browser.

A number of software developers and browsers have already incorporated some aspects of HTML 5, such as faster video streaming and storing more data in the browser for faster retrieval -- all without having to download additional software.

Google is actively pushing for inclusion of features such as ability to drag and drop files from a desktop into a Web browser, a PC-style function not typically possible now, and support for 3D graphics, he said.

Google and other backers of HTML 5 believe that over time, plug-ins won't be necessary as browsers become more powerful.

Online software can't typically launch automatically when a computer starts-up or send updates and notifications when users close their Web browsers, he says.

Dozens of companies are also developing technology to bring more parity between desktop and online software.
WSJ 7-13-09

31st Annual Mooning of Amtrak



The pants were down but so was the size of the crowd the annual "Moon Over Amtrak" event in the Orange County's Laguna Niguel, where people line up to moon passing commuter trains.

It began as a bar bet in 1979 and has continued ever since.

About 400 people showed up for Saturday's mass mooning. Last year, about 8,000 showed up, mostly out-of-towners. And deputies shut it down after things got ugly, with traffic jams, drinking and public nudity.

http://moonamtrak.org/

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Selling Boxed Software Is Just So Yesterday !



Microsoft is finally planning to offer a free web version of Office in response to Google.

Microsoft provided new details of a plan to offer a free, Web-based version of its Office software, the latest acknowledgment that the company's decades-old model of selling boxed software is fading fast.

The free online offering -- ready in the first half of 2010 along with a new version of its conventional software called Office 2010 -- is the latest milestone in an 18-month-old strategy by the world's largest software supplier to offer more of its core products on the Web.

The nearly ubiquitous Office applications include Word for word processing, the Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint for presentations and Outlook for email.

By offering lightweight versions of those products that can be used through a Web browser, Microsoft is trying to exploit the popularity of online services without curtailing the profitability of products that are still run on PCs or corporate servers (Good luck, guys !).

It is also hoping to blunt competition from Google, which offers free online applications called Google Docs and last week disclosed plans for an operating system that could compete with Microsoft's Windows, initially on low-priced portable computers called netbooks.

Microsoft, for its part, is trying to muscle in on Google's core market: Internet search advertising. Last month, Microsoft launched a new search site, called Bing, which has drawn more users though Google's service retains a big lead. Microsoft is also working on another project, code-named Gazelle, that is a hybrid of an operating system and Web browser.

Microsoft doesn't break out Office sales, but the products account for the bulk of the $19 billion in sales posted by its business division in fiscal 2008. Stephen Elop, who runs the division, said in an interview that making some of its Office products available free should help the company expand its overall business.

A key advantage of Web-based programs is that they can allow users to tap into their files from any device connected to the Internet, including hardware running non-Microsoft systems such as Linux.

Businesses may like the fact that Office Web avoids the need to install security patches and other labor-intensive support chores, says Roger Kay, an analyst at Endpoint Technologies Associates. "At the enterprise level, this could be quite attractive," he said.

Microsoft, which first confirmed last October that it would launch a free Web offering, said it would be available to consumers through its Windows Live online service.

Businesses can use Office Web through their existing volume licensing programs for Office, or purchase new subscriptions, the company said. It didn't disclose pricing for paid versions of the offering.

Vic Gundotra, Google's vice president of engineering, called Microsoft's announcement "a powerful validation" of the Web.

Before joining Google, Mr. Gundotra was general manager of Microsoft's developer outreach efforts. "I think we will look back on today as a phenomenal day when the Web has won," he said.


By Jessica Hodgson, WSJ, 7-14-09

Bush/Cheney Legacy Dep't: 12 Reasons The Economy Is Even Worse Than The Estimates




The true unemployment rate is now 16.5 % not 9.5 % and headed to 19.1 % by 2010 according to Mort Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor in Chief of U.S. News & World Report.

We are in far more trouble than the 9.5% unemployment rate indicates when you get inside the numbers.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics preliminary estimate for job losses for June is 467,000, which means 7.2 million people have lost their jobs since the start of the recession.

Here are more 12 reasons we are in even more trouble than the 9.5% unemployment rate indicates:

1. The cumulative job losses over the last six months have been greater than for any other half year period since World War II, including the military demobilization after the war.

2. The job losses are also now equal to the net job gains over the previous nine years, making this the only recession since the Great Depression to wipe out all job growth from the previous expansion.

3. The average length of unemployment is higher than it's been since government began tracking the data in 1948.

4. June's total assumed 185,000 people at work who probably were not. The government could not identify them; it made an assumption about trends. But many of the mythical jobs are in industries that have absolutely no job creation, e.g., finance. When the official numbers are adjusted over the next several months, June will look worse.

5. More companies are asking employees to take unpaid leave. These people don't count on the unemployment roll.

6. No fewer than 1.4 million people wanted or were available for work in the last 12 months but were not counted. Why? Because they hadn't searched for work in the four weeks preceding the survey.

7. The number of workers taking part-time jobs due to the slack economy, a kind of stealth underemployment, has doubled in this recession to about nine million, or 5.8% of the work force. Add those whose hours have been cut to those who cannot find a full-time job and the total unemployed rises to 16.5%, putting the number of involuntarily idle in the range of 25 million.

8. The average work week for rank-and-file employees in the private sector, roughly 80% of the work force, slipped to 33 hours. That's 48 minutes a week less than before the recession began, the lowest level since the government began tracking such data 45 years ago. Full-time workers are being downgraded to part time as businesses slash labor costs to remain above water, and factories are operating at only 65% of capacity. If Americans were still clocking those extra 48 minutes a week now, the same aggregate amount of work would get done with 3.3 million fewer employees, which means that if it were not for the shorter work week the jobless rate would be 11.7%, not 9.5% (which far exceeds the 8% rate projected by the Obama administration).

9. The average length of official unemployment increased to 24.5 weeks, the longest since government began tracking this data in 1948. The number of long-term unemployed (i.e., for 27 weeks or more) has now jumped to 4.4 million, an all-time high.

10. The average worker saw no wage gains in June, with average compensation running flat at $18.53 an hour.

11. The goods producing sector is losing the most jobs -- 223,000 in the last report alone.

12. The prospects for job creation are equally distressing. The likelihood is that when economic activity picks up, employers will first choose to increase hours for existing workers and bring part-time workers back to full time. Many unemployed workers looking for jobs once the recovery begins will discover that jobs as good as the ones they lost are almost impossible to find because many layoffs have been permanent. Instead of shrinking operations, companies have shut down whole business units or made sweeping structural changes in the way they conduct business. General Motors and Chrysler, closed hundreds of dealerships and reduced brands. Citigroup and Bank of America cut tens of thousands of positions and exited many parts of the world of finance.

Job losses may last well into 2010 to hit an unemployment peak close to 11%. That unemployment rate may be sustained for an extended period.

Can we find comfort in the fact that employment has long been considered a lagging indicator? It is conventionally seen as having limited predictive power since employment reflects decisions taken earlier in the business cycle. But today is different. Unemployment has doubled to 9.5% from 4.8% in only 16 months, a rate so fast it may influence future economic behavior and outlook.

How could this happen when Washington has thrown trillions of dollars into the pot, including the famous $787 billion in stimulus spending that was supposed to yield $1.50 in growth for every dollar spent? For a start, too much of the money went to transfer payments such as Medicaid, jobless benefits and the like that do nothing for jobs and growth. The spending that creates new jobs is new spending, particularly on infrastructure. It amounts to less than 10% of the stimulus package today.

About 40% of U.S. workers believe the recession will continue for another full year, and their pessimism is justified. As paychecks shrink and disappear, consumers are more hesitant to spend and won't lead the economy out of the doldrums quickly enough.

It may have made him unpopular in parts of the Obama administration, but Vice President Joe Biden was right when he said a week ago that the administration misread how bad the economy was and how effective the stimulus would be. It was supposed to be about jobs but it wasn't. The Recovery Act was a single piece of legislation but it included thousands of funding schemes for tens of thousands of projects, and those programs are stuck in the bureaucracy as the government releases the funds with typical inefficiency.

Another $150 billion, which was allocated to state coffers to continue programs like Medicaid, did not add new jobs; hundreds of billions were set aside for tax cuts and for new benefits for the poor and the unemployed, and they did not add new jobs. Now state budgets are drowning in red ink as jobless claims and Medicaid bills climb.

Next year state budgets will have depleted their initial rescue dollars. Absent another rescue plan, they will have no choice but to slash spending, raise taxes, or both. State and local governments, representing about 15% of the economy, are beginning the worst contraction in postwar history amid a deficit of $166 billion for fiscal 2010, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and a gap of $350 billion in fiscal 2011.

Households overburdened with historic levels of debt will also be saving more. The savings rate has already jumped to almost 7% of after-tax income from 0% in 2007, and it is still going up. Every dollar of saving comes out of consumption. Since consumer spending is the economy's main driver, we are going to have a weak consumer sector and many businesses simply won't have the means or the need to hire employees. After the 1990-91 recessions, consumers went out and bought houses, cars and other expensive goods. This time, the combination of a weak job picture and a severe credit crunch means that people won't be able to get the financing for big expenditures, and those who can borrow will be reluctant to do so. The paycheck has returned as the primary source of spending.

This process is nowhere near complete and, until it is, the economy will barely grow if it does at all, and it may well oscillate between sluggish growth and modest decline for the next several years until the rebalancing of excessive debt has been completed. Until then, the economy will be deprived of adequate profits and cash flow, and businesses will not start to hire nor race to make capital expenditures when they have vast idle capacity.

No wonder poll after poll shows a steady erosion of confidence in the stimulus. So what kind of second-act stimulus should we look for? Something that might have a real multiplier effect, not a congressional wish list of pet programs. It is critical that the Obama administration not play politics with the issue. The time to get ready for a serious infrastructure program is now. It's a shame Washington didn't get it right the first time.

edited from WSJ, 7-14-09, Mort Zuckerman's editorial

Monday, July 13, 2009

What Can Detroit Learn from the Silicon Valley?




Will the new GM innovate?

Will we catch up with China in new car technology and electric battery design?

According to Intel's former CEO Andy Grove, Detroit can learn that capital intensive, vertically integrated production is a thing of the past.

Will the auto industry's new overseers catch on?

Some clues are offer by the creative destruction of the capital-intensive mainframe computer business which was replaced by the high growth PC industry where the Silicon Valley, U.S.A. still enjoys strategic advantages.

Our government has made heavy investments in the U.S. automobile industry. How should it use its influence? It is a difficult question to answer because it appears that the automobile industry is in the middle of a fundamental transformation. There is a lot of information available on how companies have dealt with major changes in their business environments, but little is known about the transformation of entire industries.

History shows that most companies do not deal well with transformation. One reason has to do with senior managers. They usually "don't get it." They have a difficult time accepting that the future will be vastly different from the present because they rose to power in the old business environment. They excelled in the old environment and didn't acquire skills necessary to operate in the new.

It is also hard for managers to distinguish between an erosion in a company's competitive position and a change in the fundamental nature of an industry. Knowing the difference is one of the most difficult things to do, even though it is among the most important.

The transformation of an entire industry does not happen very often. It only occurs when a number of factors align, such as a change in consumer demand, a shift of parts of the major supply chain from one country to another, and the emergence of key technological changes.

This is what happened in the computer industry in the 1980s and '90s. Previously, each company produced its own mainframe computers using proprietary hardware and software. The company's sales force then sold these complex and expensive products.

The PC changed this. In a period of just a few years, the industry was pulled apart and reassembled. The entire industry began to rely on common hardware elements (microprocessors) and packaged software; selling was handed off to third parties. In business we call this moving from a "vertical" structure (where a company handles its own development, manufacturing and distribution) to a "horizontal" structure (where some companies specialize in building components while others integrate them and handle distribution tasks).

The result was that the computer industry became more dynamic as old participants (such as Burroughs and Digital Equipment) faded away and new types of companies (such as Compaq and Dell) emerged.

Typically, a single company cannot call the shots that transform an industry. But when a government gets as involved as ours has in the U.S. automobile industry, it can end up making transformational decisions.

Imagine if in the middle of the computer transformation the Reagan administration worried about the upheaval and tried to rescue this vital industry by making huge investments in leading mainframe companies. The purpose of such investments would have been to protect the viability of these companies. The effect, however, would have been to put the brakes on transformation and all but ensure that the U.S. would lose its leadership role.

The government's investment in General Motors might be directly helpful if the auto industry only had the recession to contend with. But that is not the case. The industry faces the confluence of a world-wide recession, rising fuel prices, environmental demands, globalization of manufacturing, and, most importantly, technological change involving the very nature of the automobile.

Electric cars have become viable and will likely only become more capable in the future. Components critical to their performance -- batteries and electronic control systems -- are on a rapidly rising technology curve. These technologies are new and therefore capable of improving quickly with incremental investments. By contrast, technologies that have been around a long time, such as the internal combustion engine and the fuel and drive systems built around it, have enjoyed the benefits of decades of development and have limited potential for further improvement.

The result is that there are several factors aligning to bring about a change in the structure of the automobile industry. Electric cars may match the needs of our time better and become more desirable than cars relying on the internal combustion engine. The car industry today is as vertical as the computer industry was before the PC. However, the simplicity of the electric car combined with the standardization of certain components may cause the automobile industry to shift to a horizontal structure. The Internet is already emerging as a key marketing medium for automobiles and is easily adaptable to a horizontal structure.

If such a shift occurs, the success of a producer will depend on how well it takes advantage of the new structure -- whether it can use the mass-producibility and falling cost of batteries and other components better than its competitors.

The U.S. government is investing in the automobile industry with the intention of preventing jobs from being lost. This may improve GM's ability to operate within today's structure. But there is no comparably large investment being made to develop the capabilities that could serve the company in a new era of electric cars.

China appears to be making a different bet. It's not clear precisely how the Chinese government influences industrial strategy. But China is putting a great deal of effort into developing and manufacturing batteries. Essentially, it is betting that it can take the lead in creating the foundation technology of what will likely be the new structure of the auto industry.

Which is the better investment strategy? It is too early to say. In the short term, the U.S. strategy will likely save jobs. The long term is much more problematic. We do not yet know when and if the automobile industry will shift into a horizontal structure. The stakes, however, are very high. The strategic bets being placed by each country may determine which one will end up as the world's leader in automotive technology and manufacturing.

Edited from 7-13-09 WSJ by Andy Grove is the former CEO of Intel Corp
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Friday, July 10, 2009

Google Chrome OS Rolls in Summer 2010


Just as Microsoft was poised to continue its netbook dominance with Windows 7, Google announces an operating system of its own, Google Chrome OS, which will run on both x86 and ARM systems.

The emphasis of the OS is the same as what netbooks were originally designed for: light, Web-based computing. Obviously, Windows XP wasn't designed for such a scenario, but its relative light weight, low cost, and familiarity have made it a big hit with netbook buyers.

Google's new open-source OS will almost certainly beat XP and Windows 7 on cost, and will be lighter weight, but there's no telling how it will be to actually use—and the failure of Linux on netbooks shows that people want to be able to use their netbook OS right out of the box.

Google's blog entry about the OS says:
"The user interface is minimal to stay out of your way, and most of the user experience takes place on the Web. And as we did for the Google Chrome browser, we are going back to the basics and completely redesigning the underlying security architecture of the OS so that users don't have to deal with viruses, malware and security updates. It should just work."

According to Google, the Chrome OS runs "within a new windowing system on top of a Linux kernel," and will eventually run on everything from netbooks to full desktop PCs. That's the key differentiator between the full-blown Chrome OS and Google's Android, which will start appearing in netbooks in the next few months (Google says there will be areas of overlap for the two operating systems, netbooks being the main one).

From a developer standpoint, the Chrome OS is good news, because there's basically no new platform to write for—any browser-based app will work with Chrome, just as it will in any browser on any OS.


Google says it is already talking with "multiple OEMs," and that we can expect Chrome netbooks to hit store shelves in the second half of 2010—yup, you've got a year to wait. Will you have Win7 on your netbook by then?

from PC Magazine.com

Thursday, July 9, 2009

Google Chrome Taking Aim at Windows



Google Inc.'s plan to build a computer operating system confirms what Chief Executive Eric Schmidt has downplayed for years: The Internet giant is challenging Microsoft Corp. in virtually all its businesses.

The operating system, dubbed Google Chrome OS and announced late Tuesday, is designed to ouflank a giant: Microsoft's Windows, which already runs the vast majority of the world's personal computers. Google now offers rival products in many of Microsoft's major businesses, except for videogame machines and heavy-duty commercial software.

Critics say it's a risky strategy, with 70 % of current applications requiring Microsoft Windows, according to Gatrner analysts. However, this view is based on the marketplace today, instead of where the marketplace is already headed, toward greater use of web-centric devices.

And, while it could prove to be a distraction from Google's main business, selling ads online. Google's revenue growth has slowed dramatically in recent years, so it is may be placing a big bet that its future growth will come from offering online software.

Chrome OS is also trying to redefine the idea of what a computer operating system should be. In a blog post Tuesday night, Google said the operating system would have the ability to boot up and let users get online in just seconds and new security features, addressing sore points for some users of PCs that run Microsoft Windows. Google is also betting customers will gravitate toward online software that requires an Internet connection, as opposed to conventional PC programs that are downloaded and installed.

Mr. Schmidt, a veteran of Sun Microsystems Inc. and Novell Inc., fought bruising battles in the 1990s as the two companies couldn't match Microsoft's advantages in marketing Windows.

In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Schmidt said he isn't obsessed with competing with Microsoft, and that the company's strategy is to create new markets for online applications. "This is about opening up a whole new area," he said. "Google is not about doing the same thing that everyone else has done," he said. He also said it is natural for Google to think about competing with Microsoft but that doing so takes up "very little" of his time. Microsoft declined to comment about the new Google software. But some people familiar with the matter have said Mr. Schmidt has tried to dent Microsoft's business throughout his tenure at Google.

From roughly 2003 to 2005, Mr. Schmidt convened regular secret meetings of a small group of executives to discuss how to best compete with Microsoft in specific product areas, an effort code-named "Canada," according to people familiar with the meetings. He was quick to try to foil Microsoft's plans to acquire Yahoo Inc. last year, calling then-Yahoo CEO Jerry Yang to offer help fending off Microsoft's hostile takeover attempt, say other people familiar with the matter.

Google's focus on Microsoft partly grew out of longstanding concerns that it would undermine Google's business by making it tough for Google to offer a search toolbar on the Internet Explorer Web browser, according to several former employees.

Google's work on a Web browser and operating system dates back many years, according to people briefed on the projects. Google co-founder Larry Page has long wanted to release a Web browser and accompanying software, say these people, in order to build faster and more powerful Web-based technology. But Mr. Schmidt held him back, arguing that Google ought to continue to focus on search and search advertising for now and wait to strike later, these people said.

In September 2008, Google introduced its own browser, similarly named Chrome, to compete with Microsoft's market-leading Internet Explorer. Now, Google is essentially building its new operating-system software around its Chrome browser, supported by core programming code from the Linux operating system.

The approach, Google engineers argue, means that any application designed to run with a standard Web browser will automatically run on Chrome OS as well as on other major browsers and operating systems. The advantage is that Google instantly will start with a built-in base of programmers.

Chrome OS is being designed to run both on machines powered by the PC chips popularized by Intel Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. as well as designs licensed by ARM Holdings PLC that are normally used in cellphones.

ARM chips are trying to push into the market for low-cost netbook computers. ARM-based machines could be considerably less expensive and offer longer battery life, says Ramesh Iyer, head of world-wide business development for mobile computing at Texas Instruments Inc., an ARM backer that is working with Google on the operating system.

More broadly, Chrome OS could add to the forces lined up against the so-called "Wintel" juggernaut -- the slang term for the technology standard based on Microsoft's Windows software and Intel's chips that created a massive industry. Some observers also see Google Chrome helping to accelerate a shift in the PC industry to become more like the cellphone industry, with hardware and software largely subsidized by carriers charging monthly service fees. Some netbooks are already being offered this way.

"Obviously the loser in this is people in the PC industry who think high-priced hardware and high-priced software are the future," said Jim Zemlin, executive director of the Linux Foundation, a nonprofit group that helps oversee the evolution of free or low-cost Linux-based operating systems.

Intel has also been promoting a variant of Linux called Moblin for use in netbooks and other products. Intel says it was aware of Google's Chrome OS. "We applaud Google's move here," an Intel spokesman said in prepared remarks. "More choice in this area will benefit the industry and likely speed innovation."

Google's approach comes with special obstacles. For one thing, Web-based based software usually runs on a remote server, not on the user's local PC; therefore, a netbook running Chrome OS isn't likely to be able to do much when it is not connected to the Internet, says Al Gillen, an analyst at IDC. Though many applications will eventually migrate online, some parts of the world don't have wireless broadband connections to support this kind of software.

Google's Chrome browser, meanwhile, hasn't become a big hit. It had less than 2% market share in May, according to Net Applications, a market-research firm, compared to 65.5% for Microsoft's Internet Explorer and 22.5% for the Mozilla Foundation's Firefox browser.

The concept of using a Web browser for software development was debated in the 1990s, during the fight involving browser pioneer Netscape Communications that led the Justice Department to bring a high-profile antitrust case against Microsoft. Microsoft executives competed aggressively against Netscape browsers, which they viewed as a major threat to weaken Windows' influence over software developers.

The Chrome OS appears tightly linked to the Chrome Web browser, but Chrome's market share is tiny, and there's no clear link between areas where Google could be considered dominant -- search and online advertising -- and the new operating system.

edited from WSJ - 07/09/09

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

Avoiding Car Repair Rip-Offs





Here are some sites to check pricing on car repairs so you won't get ripped off.

http://www.driverside.com/


http://repairpal.com/

Move Over Windows > Heads Are Spinning in Redmond


Today, Google announces the development of a lightweight, web oriented operating system, taking straight aim at Microsoft Windows line, especially in the fast growth end of notebooks -- netbooks -- where a nimble OS is all that's needed.

http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/introducing-google-chrome-os.html

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

How I Spent My Summer: Teens Hack the iPhone


Like many teenagers, Ari Weinstein spends his summers riding his bike and swimming. This year, the 15-year-old had another item on his to-do list: Foil Apple Inc.'s brightest engineers and annoy chief executive Steve Jobs.

Ari is part of a loose-knit group of hackers that has made it a mission to "jailbreak" Apple's iPhone and iPod touch. The term refers to installing unapproved software that lets people download a range of programs, including those not sanctioned by Apple.

Since Apple began selling its latest iPhone 3GS on June 19, Ari and six online cohorts spent hours a day probing the new product for security holes.

This weekend, one of the members of the group, dubbed the Chronic Dev Team, released the jailbreaking software they've been working on. Ari says the program is a test version with some bugs, but that users have successfully downloaded it. A quarter-million people have visited the site, he says.


"Coding and testing things that may or may not work, and figuring things out, is a really rewarding experience," says Ari, a Philadelphia resident who began hacking when he was 11.
Ari's hobby has ruffled the feathers of famously secretive Apple, which exerts tight control over its gadgets and sells programs for its iPhones exclusively through its App Store site.

"The vast majority of customers do not jailbreak their iPhones, and for good reason," an Apple spokeswoman says. "These modifications not only violate the warranty, they also cause the iPhone to become unstable and not work reliably."
Teen hacker Ari Weinstein captured a share of Internet notoriety when he developed jailbreaking software for an Apple iPhone. But now, he's trying to go legit, as he spends his summer tooling up a new app.

Yukari Iwatani Kane reports from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Jobs, in the past, has called dueling with hackers a "cat-and-mouse game" and has said it is Apple's "job to stop them from breaking in." So far, Apple hasn't stopped them. A year ago, when the Cupertino, Calif., company launched its iPhone 3G, a team of hackers released jailbreaking software for the device less than a week later.

The software, which can be downloaded from a Web site, gives users access to a store that sells programs that Apple doesn't. These include applications that block ads on the iPhone's mobile Internet browser, for example, or let the phone double as a laptop-computer modem.


In February, Apple filed a 27-page statement to the U.S. Copyright office arguing that modifying phones violates the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Digital-rights advocates say they believe it isn't illegal because people own their phones outright. The copyright office is expected to rule in the fall.


Ari says he takes ethics seriously and says he has researched the Millennium Copyright law online. But he has concluded his actions aren't wrong. He also has a lawyer, who he says volunteered his services after Ari created iJailbreak, a piece of free software that worked on the original iPhone, two years ago.
"Apple doesn't have the right to tell me what I can put on my phone," says Ari, who uses non-Apple-sanctioned programs that let him change the look of his home screen and administer Web sites from his phone. "I only do hacking that helps people."

At age 7, Ari teamed up with two other boys to create playing cards, decorated with hand-drawn characters, to sell online. The business never took off. But Ari says he learned to build Web sites, among other things: The site he created wasn't on the child-approved list of his AOL Internet service, he says, so to access it, he had to figure out how to get around AOL's parental controls. "That's when we knew we should start teaching him ethics," says his dad, Ken Weinstein, 45, a real-estate developer.

Ari started hacking in sixth grade after looking for a way to download free games on his iPod mini. Two years ago, he received an iPod touch for his bar mitzvah and says he jailbroke the device in an evening. He later simplified the process into the iJailbreak software.
He says the program has been downloaded a million times. Some users donated cash, a standard way of showing appreciation for free software, and Ari says he received "several thousand dollars" in all.

Ari attracted the attention of Will Strafach, a Connecticut teen who created an online chat room for people interested in reverse engineering the iPhone. That eventually morphed into a team named after Mr. Strafach's Internet name, Chronic. "When I get out" of school, Mr. Strafach says, "I want to work for Apple."


Ari, who goes by AriX online, soon began to work with the Chronic Dev Team's half-dozen teenagers and twentysomethings. The group communicates almost exclusively via a private online chat room, where they can talk and send files. Team members say they don't know all the others' real-life identities. One of them, Mr. Strafach says, lives in Austria.
Earlier this year, Ari and his team tried to hack more efficiently by working with another group -- iPhone Dev Team, an invitation-only bunch in their 20s and 30s who have typically been the first to roll out iPhone hacks.

Members of the iPhone Dev Team worried about working in a large group. In part, they were concerned that if information leaked out about the security holes they were probing, others could exploit them first. Or, Apple could plug the holes. In March, the two groups stopped communicating.
"It just came down to a trust issue," says Eric McDonald, an iPhone Dev Team member known as MuscleNerd.

In June, Apple announced its 32-gigabyte iPhone, with added layers of security and encryption. Ari bought one immediately, in part with the $20 an hour he earned helping family friends with computer problems.
"I'm happy to contribute," says Michael Cohen, a real-estate investor who recently hired Ari to help set up his wife's new computer. "He obviously has a future in this stuff."

Mr. Strafach's group also sought help from George Hotz, a 19-year-old Cambridge, Mass., hacker who had worked before with Chronic Dev. Known as geohot, Mr. Hotz is widely acknowledged as the first person to "unlock" the iPhone nearly two years ago, so people could use the phone with any wireless carrier.
Mr. Hotz, who took a paid internship with Google Inc. in April, joined the hackers in early June. In emails, he says he has done the project on his own time and was happy to help "a bunch of cool guys with a good attitude." Google declined to comment on Mr. Hotz's work with Chronic Dev.

More than a week ago, both Chronic Dev and iPhone Dev said they figured out how to jailbreak Apple's new phone. The iPhone Dev Team wanted to wait to release its software so Apple can't plug the security hole in the device immediately.
But Chronic Dev and Mr. Hotz released theirs as soon as it was ready. "A lot of people bought their phones expecting to jailbreak their phones, and now that we have the capability to do it, we should let them," Ari says. "A lot of people have thanked us."

from 7/7/09 WSJ

Moonwalking in L.A.


After winning a random drawing for tickets to the Michael Jackson memorial, fans danced and sang on Monday, and some tried to make a buck, while city officials girded for the throngs expected to show up at the Tuesday event, invited or not.

As organizers distributed free pairs of tickets on Monday to 8,750 of the more 1.6 million people who had applied online for them, offers of tickets priced from a few hundred to several thousand dollars appeared on Web sites like eBay and Craigslist. Site administrators rushed to remove the postings, saying such sales were not authorized by the Staples Center, the downtown arena that will host the event. Organizers of the memorial said they were confident security measures would limit illegitimate ticket holders.

But the efforts at selling tickets, as well as signs of downtown hotels filling and the police preparing for thousands of people, if not more, by ringing a security perimeter around the event, added to a sense that the memorial was taking on shades of spectacle.

Late Monday night, local television broadcast live images of Jackson family members and others arriving and departing from Forest Lawn Hollywood Hills, a San Fernando Valley cemetery studded with celebrity graves where Mr. Jackson's private service is expected Tuesday morning. A hearse was seen driving from one building to another, backing nearly into it through a large entrance way where men then removed a coffin covered by a dark cloth.

The official list of participants in the service for Mr. Jackson, who died suddenly on June 25 at 50 of undetermined causes, included some of the biggest names in music, past and present, including Stevie Wonder, John Mayer, Jennifer Hudson, Smokey Robinson and Usher. More than a dozen television channels, including the big broadcast networks, planned live coverage of the memorial, which is set for 10 a.m. California time on Tuesday.

Elizabeth Taylor, one of Mr. Jackson’s closest friends, sent word through her Twitter feed that she had turned down an offer to speak to avoid what she called “the public whoopla.”

Debbie Rowe, a former wife of Mr. Jackson and the mother of two of his three children, changed her mind about attending, saying through a spokeswoman that “the onslaught of media attention has made it clear her attendance would be an unnecessary distraction.” Ms. Rowe, who was shown on local television Monday screaming and cursing at photographers trailing her near her home, has not announced whether she will seek custody of the children, whom Mr. Jackson had wanted raised by his mother, or failing that, Diana Ross.

Mr. Jackson’s body will not be at the memorial. There were reports that he would be buried Tuesday before the memorial at a cemetery in the San Fernando Valley. A large squad of police and security officers was at the cemetery, but officials declined to comment.

Councilwoman Jan Perry, who is the city’s acting mayor while Antonio R. Villaraigosa is on vacation this week, said she had not received any responses to her pleas for private donors to offset the city’s costs, including overtime for the police, transportation and sanitation departments.

First Assistant Chief Jim McDonnell said a “substantial” number of police officers would be deployed to control a crowd he said could include least 100,000 people. “Some people are coming in from around the world to be part of it,” Chief McDonnell said. “They just want to be close to it.”

In the Staples Center, which holds nearly 20,000 people for sporting events, 11,000 seats were reserved for fans, along with 6,500 at an adjacent theater, where the event will be shown on large video screens.

Robert S. McNamara - Bio


Robert S. McNamara, the forceful and cerebral defense secretary who helped lead the nation into the maelstrom of Vietnam and spent the rest of his life wrestling with the war’s moral consequences, died Monday at his home in Washington. He was 93.

His wife, Diana, said Mr. McNamara died in his sleep at 5:30 a.m., adding that he had been in failing health for some time.

Mr. McNamara was the most influential defense secretary of the 20th century. Serving Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from 1961 to 1968, he oversaw hundreds of military missions, thousands of nuclear weapons and billions of dollars in military spending and foreign arms sales. He also enlarged the defense secretary’s role, handling foreign diplomacy and the dispatch of troops to enforce civil rights in the South.

“He’s like a jackhammer,” Johnson said. “No human being can take what he takes. He drives too hard. He is too perfect.”

As early as April 1964, Senator Wayne Morse, Democrat of Oregon, called Vietnam “McNamara’s War.” Mr. McNamara did not object. “I am pleased to be identified with it,” he said, “and do whatever I can to win it.”

Half a million American soldiers went to war on his watch. More than 16,000 died; 42,000 more would fall in the seven years to come.

The war became his personal nightmare. Nothing he did, none of the tools at his command — the power of American weapons, the forces of technology and logic, or the strength of American soldiers — could stop the armies of North Vietnam and their South Vietnamese allies, the Vietcong. He concluded well before leaving the Pentagon that the war was futile, but he did not share that insight with the public until late in life.

In 1995, he took a stand against his own conduct of the war, confessing in a memoir that it was “wrong, terribly wrong.” In return, he faced a firestorm of scorn.

“Mr. McNamara must not escape the lasting moral condemnation of his countrymen,” The New York Times said in a widely discussed editorial, written by the page’s editor at the time, Howell Raines. “Surely he must in every quiet and prosperous moment hear the ceaseless whispers of those poor boys in the infantry, dying in the tall grass, platoon by platoon, for no purpose. What he took from them cannot be repaid by prime-time apology and stale tears, three decades late.”

By then he wore the expression of a haunted man. He could be seen in the streets of Washington — stooped, his shirttail flapping in the wind — walking to and from his office a few blocks from the White House, wearing frayed running shoes and a thousand-yard stare.

He had spent decades thinking through the lessons of the war. The greatest of these was to know one’s enemy — and to “empathize with him,” as Mr. McNamara explained in Errol Morris’s 2003 documentary, “The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara.”

“We must try to put ourselves inside their skin and look at us through their eyes,” he said. The American failure in Vietnam, he said, was seeing the enemy through the prism of the cold war, as a domino that would topple the nations of Asia if it fell.

In the film, Mr. McNamara described the American firebombing of Japan’s cities in World War II. He had played a supporting role in those attacks, running statistical analysis for Gen. Curtis E. LeMay of the Army’s Air Forces.

“We burned to death 100,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo — men, women and children,” Mr. McNamara recalled; some 900,000 Japanese civilians died in all. “LeMay said, ‘If we’d lost the war, we’d all have been prosecuted as war criminals.’ And I think he’s right. He — and I’d say I — were behaving as war criminals.”

“What makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?” he asked. He found the question impossible to answer.

From Detroit to Washington

The idea of the United States’ losing a war seemed impossible when Mr. McNamara came to the Pentagon in January 1961 as the nation’s eighth defense secretary. He was 44 and had been named president of the Ford Motor Company only 10 weeks before. He later said, half-seriously, that he could barely tell a nuclear warhead from a station wagon when he arrived in Washington.

“Mr. President, it’s absurd; I’m not qualified,” he remembered protesting when asked to serve. He said that Kennedy had replied, “Look, Bob, I don’t think there’s any school for presidents, either.”

Kennedy called him the smartest man he had ever met. Mr. McNamara looked steely-eyed and supremely rational behind his wire-rimmed glasses, his brown hair slicked back precisely and crisply parted on top. Mr. McNamara had risen by his mastery of systems analysis, the business of making sense of large organizations — taking on a big problem, studying every facet, finding simplicity in the complexity.

His first mission was to defuse the myth of the missile gap. Kennedy had argued in his 1960 presidential campaign that the strategic nuclear arsenal of the United States was less powerful than the Soviet Union’s, and that the gap was growing. His predecessor as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, called the missile gap a fiction in his final State of the Union address, on Jan. 12, 1961.

Mr. McNamara took office nine days later. He recalled that “my first responsibility as secretary of defense was to determine the degree of the gap and initiate action to close it.”

“It took us about three weeks to determine, yes, there was a gap,” he told an oral historian at his alma mater, the University of California, Berkeley. “But the gap was in our favor. It was a totally erroneous charge that Eisenhower had allowed the Soviets to develop a superior missile force.”

The problem was a lack of accurate intelligence; the estimate of Soviet forces had been a product of politics and guesswork.

By year’s end, new American spy satellites had determined that the Soviets had as few as 10 launchers from which missiles could be fired at the United States, while the United States could strike with more than 3,200 nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Mr. McNamara was enmeshed in plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which some 1,500 Cubans, trained and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency, were badly defeated by Fidel Castro’s forces in a bloody battle in April 1961. Mr. McNamara doubted that the C.I.A.’s Cubans could overthrow Mr. Castro, who had taken power in 1959, but he asked few questions beforehand and gave his go-ahead to the plan, which had been conceived under the Eisenhower administration.

Kennedy’s first order to Mr. McNamara after the invasion of Cuba collapsed was to develop a proposal for overthrowing the Castro government with American military force. Ten days later, he submitted a plan of attack that included 60,000 American troops, excluding naval and air forces. The plan proved impossible to fulfill.

One lesson of the Bay of Pigs, Mr. McNamara told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that “the government should never start anything unless it could be finished, or the government was willing to face the consequences of failure,” according to the State Department’s official record of American foreign policy, “The Foreign Relations of the United States.”

At a White House meeting on Nov. 3, 1961, Kennedy authorized a program designed to undermine the Castro government, code-named Operation Mongoose. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s handwritten notes on the meeting say Mr. McNamara was assigned to survey the situation and help him devise ways “to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder.” This operation also failed.

By 1962, the White House and the Pentagon had devised a new strategy of counterinsurgency to combat what Mr. McNamara called the tactics of “terror, extortion and assassination” by communist guerrillas. The call led to the creation of American special forces like the Green Berets and secret paramilitary operations throughout Asia and Latin America.

“Counterinsurgency became an almost ridiculous battle cry,” said Robert Amory, who in 1962 stepped down after nine years as the C.I.A.’s deputy director of intelligence to become the White House budget officer for classified programs.

While the United States flailed at Cuba, the Soviet Union decided, in the words of its leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, “to throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants.” It began sending nuclear missiles to Cuba, establishing a direct threat that evened up the balance of power with the United States, which had placed its own missiles near the Soviet border in Turkey.

At the height of the missile crisis, on Oct. 27, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Cuba be invaded within 36 hours. As the secret White House taping system installed by Kennedy recorded his words, Mr. McNamara laid out the prospects for war.

“The military plan is basically invasion,” he said. “When we attack Cuba, we are going to have to attack with an all-out attack.”

He continued, “The Soviet Union may, and, I think, probably will, attack the Turkish missiles.” The United States would then have to attack Soviet ships or bases in the Black Sea, he said. The chances of an uncontrolled escalation were high.

“And I would say that it is damn dangerous,” he said. “Now, I’m not sure we can avoid anything like that if we attack Cuba. But I think we should make every effort to avoid it. And one way to avoid it is to defuse the Turkish missiles before we attack Cuba.”

That idea — a secret deal in which Kennedy offered to withdraw his missiles in Turkey if Khrushchev removed his warheads from Cuba — resolved the crisis. “In the end, we lucked out — it was luck that prevented nuclear war,” Mr. McNamara said in “The Fog of War,” 40 years after the fact.

Mr. McNamara spent countless hours as secretary of defense trying to fine-tune American plans for nuclear war, turning what had been a hair-trigger, all-or-nothing strategy into a series of more limited options. The underlying principle of nuclear deterrence became known as “mutual assured destruction” — meaning that Washington and Moscow each knew it could destroy the other even if the other struck first.

In retirement, Mr. McNamara argued that planning for nuclear war was futile. “Nuclear weapons serve no military purposes whatsoever,” he wrote. “They are totally useless — except only to deter one’s opponent from using them.”

He had come close to that conclusion after the Cuban missile crisis. “In wars prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, damage was reparable and victory attainable,” Mr. McNamara said on Dec. 14, 1962, in a speech to NATO foreign ministers in Paris. “But after a full nuclear exchange such as the Soviet bloc and the NATO alliance are now able to carry out, the fatalities might well exceed 150 million.”

“The devastation would be complete and victory a meaningless term,” he said.

Remaking the Pentagon

“This place is a jungle, a jungle,” Mr. McNamara said after a few weeks at his desk at the Pentagon. He sent teams of bright young civilians — the whiz kids, as they were known — out across the Pentagon to tame it.

They set out to make sense of a cacophony of war strategies, weapons systems and budgets among the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The office of the secretary of defense had been established in 1947 for precisely that purpose, but the task had defeated everyone who held the job before Mr. McNamara. He applied the tools of systems analysis and succeeded in clearing some swaths through the jungle. But he alienated key members of Congress and military commanders in battles over choosing weapons and closing bases.

The Pentagon consumed nearly half the national budget when he took office. He had 3.5 million employees — including 2.5 million in uniform, a number that increased by a million during his tenure. He said his goal was “to bring efficiency to a $40 billion enterprise beset by jealousies and political pressures.”

Under Mr. McNamara, the Pentagon’s budget increased to $74.9 billion in fiscal 1968, from $48.4 billion in 1962. The 1968 figure is equal to $457 billion in today’s dollars.

That was largely the cost of the war that erupted in Southeast Asia.

“Every quantitative measurement we have shows we are winning this war,” Mr. McNamara said after returning from his first trip to South Vietnam in April 1962. His statistical analysis showed that the military mission could be wrapped up in three or four years.

After Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Mr. McNamara found that Johnson depended on him to win the war, which became a full-fledged conflict for the United States the following year. The new president thought so highly of Mr. McNamara that he asked him to be his running mate in 1964.

“I said no,” Mr. McNamara recounted in his Berkeley oral history. “You shouldn’t start your elective career running for the vice presidency.” (Johnson chose Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota.)

Johnson relied on Mr. McNamara in other sensitive matters, including negotiations over weapons sales to Israel and the full racial integration of the armed services, the reserves and the National Guard after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When Johnson, early in his presidency, announced he wanted to keep the federal budget below $100 billion, Mr. McNamara ordered weapons programs canceled and military bases closed in a matter of days.

But by the fall of 1964, Vietnam was the all-consuming obsession.

Congress authorized the war after Johnson contended that American warships had been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 4, 1964. The attack never happened, as a report declassified by the National Security Agency in 2005 made clear. The American ships had been firing at radar shadows on a dark night.

At the time, however, the agency’s experts in signals intelligence, or sigint, told Mr. McNamara that the evidence of an attack was iron-clad. “McNamara had taken over raw sigint and shown the president what they thought was evidence,” said Ray Cline, then the C.I.A.’s deputy director of intelligence. He added, “It was just what Johnson was looking for.”

Nor was this the only case of faulty intelligence underlying American military action under Mr. McNamara. In April 1965, Johnson ordered 24,000 American troops to the Dominican Republic after a revolt against the government; it was the first large-scale American landing in Latin America since 1928.

In public, Mr. McNamara said the deployment had showed the “readiness and capabilities of the U.S. defense establishment to support our foreign policy.” In private, he voiced dismay. The C.I.A. had told the White House and the Pentagon that the rebels were controlled by Cuban revolutionaries. But Mr. McNamara had deep doubts.

“You don’t think C.I.A. can document it?” Johnson asked him, according to tapes of White House telephone conversations recorded on April 30, 1965.

“I don’t think so, Mr. President,” McNamara replied. “I just don’t believe the story.”

Johnson nonetheless insisted in a speech to the American people that he would not allow “Communist conspirators” to establish “another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere.” This led some newspapers to assert that the president and the Pentagon had a “credibility gap.” The phrase stuck when applied to Vietnam.

Turning on Vietnam

In 1965, tens of thousands of American combat troops were arriving in Vietnam and American warplanes were pounding the enemy in a bombing campaign code-named Rolling Thunder, which sent 55,000 flights with 33,000 tons of bombs over North Vietnam; the next year, it was 148,000 flights with 128,000 tons. The number of aircraft lost went from 171 in 1965 to 318 the next year; the costs soared to $1.2 billion, from $460 million.

Rolling Thunder never stopped the flow of enemy arms and soldiers into South Vietnam.

When Mr. McNamara held a rare private briefing for reporters in Honolulu in February 1966, he no longer possessed the radiant confidence he had always displayed in public. Mr. McNamara said with conviction, “No amount of bombing can end the war.”

By 1966, Mr. McNamara was planning to build an electronic barrier across the demilitarized zone that separated North and South Vietnam. Soldiers called it the McNamara Line, after the Maginot Line, a futile French defense against Germany built before World War II. The barrier proved to be worthless.

On Aug. 26, 1966, Mr. McNamara read a book-length C.I.A. study called “The Vietnamese Communists’ Will to Persist,” which concluded that nothing the United States was doing could defeat the enemy. He called in a C.I.A. analyst, George Allen, who had spent 17 years working on the question of Vietnam.

“He wanted to know what I would do if I were sitting in his place,” Mr. Allen wrote in his 2001 memoir of Vietnam, “None So Blind.” “I decided to respond candidly.”

“Stop the buildup of American forces,” he said he told Mr. McNamara. “Halt the bombing of the North, and negotiate a cease-fire with Hanoi.”

After that moment of truth, Mr. McNamara told his aides to begin compiling a top-secret history of the war — later known as the Pentagon Papers — and he began asking himself what the United States was doing in Vietnam. Many Americans were asking the same, giving rise to a growing antiwar movement that even Mr. McNamara’s own son participated in as a student protester at Stanford.

On Sept. 19, 1966, Mr. McNamara telephoned Johnson.

“I myself am more and more convinced that we ought definitely to plan on termination of bombing in the North,” Mr. McNamara said, according to White House tapes.

He also suggested establishing a ceiling on the number of troops to be sent to Vietnam. “I don’t think we ought to just look ahead to the future and say we’re going to go higher and higher and higher and higher — 600,000; 700,000; whatever it takes.”

The president’s only response was an unintelligible grunt.

Departure and Guilt

The turning point came on May 19, 1967, when Mr. McNamara sent a long and carefully argued paper to Johnson, urging him to negotiate a peace rather than escalate the war.

The war, the paper began, “is becoming increasingly unpopular as it escalates — causing more American casualties, more fear of its growing into a wider war, more privation of the domestic sector, and more distress at the amount of suffering being visited on the noncombatants in Vietnam, South and North.”

“Most Americans,” Mr. McNamara continued, “are convinced that somehow we should not have gotten this deeply in. All want the war ended and expect their president to end it. Successfully. Or else.”

That was the last straw for Johnson, who came to believe that Mr. McNamara was secretly plotting to help Robert Kennedy, then a Democratic senator from New York, run on a peace ticket in the 1968 election. The president announced on Nov. 29, 1967, that Mr. McNamara would give up his defense post to run the World Bank. Mr. McNamara left the Pentagon two months later, never comprehending, in his words, “whether I quit or was fired.” It was clearly the latter.

Mr. McNamara had sought to transform the armed services. But his often aloof and occasionally arrogant conduct left him with few allies inside the Pentagon when the war began to go wrong. At a going-away luncheon given by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Mr. McNamara wept as he spoke of the futility of the air war in Vietnam. Many of his colleagues were appalled as he condemned the bombing, aghast at the weight of his guilt.

He had thought for a long time that the United States could not win the war. In retirement, he listed reasons: a failure to understand the enemy, a failure to see the limits of high-tech weapons, a failure to tell the truth to the American people and a failure to grasp the nature of the threat of communism.

“What went wrong was a basic misunderstanding or misevaluation of the threat to our security represented by the North Vietnamese,” he said in his Berkeley oral history. “It led President Eisenhower in 1954 to say that if Vietnam were lost, or if Laos and Vietnam were lost, the dominoes would fall.”

He continued, “I am certain we exaggerated the threat.”

“We didn’t know our opposition,” he said. “We didn’t understand the Chinese; we didn’t understand the Vietnamese, particularly the North Vietnamese. So the first lesson is know your opponents. I want to suggest to you that we don’t know our potential opponents today.”

An Analytical Mind

Robert Strange McNamara — Strange was his mother’s maiden name — was born June 9, 1916, in San Francisco to Robert and Clara Nell McNamara. His father, the son of Irish immigrants, managed a wholesale shoe company.

“My earliest memory is of a city exploding with joy,” he said in “The Fog of War.” It was Nov. 11, 1918 — the end of World War I. He remembered the tops of the streetcars crowded with people cheering and kissing.

In 1937, Mr. McNamara graduated with honors in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, where he also studied philosophy. After two years at Harvard Business School, he spent a year with Price, Waterhouse & Company, the accounting firm. He returned to Harvard in 1940 as an assistant professor of business administration.

That year, he married his college sweetheart, Margaret Craig. She created Reading Is Fundamental, a literacy program for poor children, while he was at the Pentagon. By the time she died in 1981, the program served three million children.

Mr. McNamara and his second wife, the former Diana Masieri Byfield, were married in 2004 in San Francisco.

Besides his wife, Mr. McNamara is survived by his son, Robert Craig, of Winters, Calif.; two daughters, Margaret Elizabeth Pastor and Kathleen McNamara, both of Washington, and six grandchildren.

When World War II came, Mr. McNamara taught young air officers the statistical methods he had learned at Harvard, with the aim of orchestrating the air war in Europe by determining how many planes could fly each day in every theater. He served in England, then India, and held the rank of lieutenant colonel at war’s end in 1945.

“After the war, my wife and I both came down with polio, if you can imagine, infantile paralysis,” Mr. McNamara remembered in his memoir. “My case was relatively light; I was out of the hospital in a couple of months. But she was in the hospital for nine months, and they thought she’d never lift an arm or a leg off the bed again.”

Unable to pay the hospital bills on a Harvard salary, he accepted a job offer from the Ford Motor Company.

He and nine other air-war statisticians, none older than 30, were hired by Henry Ford II to reorganize a mismanaged company.

“He wanted some individuals who he could feel were his men, if you will, because the company was staffed with old-line executives who had been associated with his father and grandfather,” Mr. McNamara recalled.

The company lost $85 million in the first eight months after Mr. McNamara’s arrival, the equivalent of about $925 million adjusted for inflation today. But Mr. McNamara and his young team turned Ford around. He rose swiftly — comptroller, general manager of the Ford division, vice president for all car and truck divisions.

In November 1960, one day after Kennedy’s election, Mr. McNamara was named president of the company, the No. 2 position under Mr. Ford, who was chairman and chief executive. Five weeks later, Kennedy asked him to run the Pentagon.

The World Bank Years

Mr. McNamara’s time at the Pentagon came close to breaking his spirit. But he immediately followed that ordeal with 13 years as president of the World Bank. He set out to expand the bank’s power and to attack global poverty. He succeeded in part, but with unintended consequences.

The industrialized nations created the bank at the end of World War II to help rebuild Western Europe, but it later expanded its membership and shifted its focus to lending in the third world to increase economic growth and forestall war. In 1973 Mr. McNamara dedicated himself to the reduction of what he called “absolute poverty — utter degradation” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

As he had done at the Pentagon and Ford, Mr. McNamara sought to remake the bank. When he arrived on April 1, 1968, the bank was lending about $1 billion a year. That figure grew until it stood at $12 billion when he left in 1981. By that time the bank oversaw some 1,600 projects valued at $100 billion in 100 nations, including hydroelectric dams, superhighways and steel factories.

The ecological effects of these developments, however, had not been taken into account. In some cases, corruption in the governments that the bank sought to help undid its good intentions. Many poor nations, overwhelmed by their debts to the bank, were not able to repay loans.

The costs of Mr. McNamara’s work thus sometimes outweighed the benefits, and that led to a concerted political attack on the bank itself during the 1980s.

Mr. McNamara saw some of these problems as they developed and shifted the emphasis of the bank’s lending toward smaller projects — irrigation, seeds and fertilizer, paving farm-to-market roads. But progress was often hard to measure. At the end of his tenure, the bank estimated that the world’s poorest numbered 800 million, an increase of 200 million over the decade.

Public Contrition

Mr. McNamara left the bank when he turned 65, after his wife died, and for a time he tried to unwind and get away, taking a 140-mile hike up to the 18,000-foot level of Mount Everest. But within two years, he began to speak out against the nuclear arms race. In 1995, 14 years after leaving public life, he published his denunciation of the Vietnam War and his role in it, “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam” (Times Books/Random House), for which he was denounced in turn.

Unlike any other secretary of defense, Mr. McNamara struggled in public with the morality of war and the uses of American power.

“We are the strongest nation in the world today,” Mr. McNamara said in “The Fog of War,” released at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. “I do not believe that we should ever apply that economic, political, and military power unilaterally. If we had followed that rule in Vietnam, we wouldn’t have been there. None of our allies supported us. Not Japan, not Germany, not Britain or France. If we can’t persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we’d better re-examine our reasoning.”

“War is so complex it’s beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend,” he concluded. “Our judgment, our understanding, are not adequate. And we kill people unnecessarily.”

fron New York TImes, 7/7/09